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Wednesday, August 18, 2021

Manhattan, NY Commute Flows

Manhattan, NYC


New York City is the city Americans think about when they compare city life with suburban or rural life.

And, when people advocate for high-density living, public transit, and against suburban "sprawl" they usually use NYC as their model, for better or worse.

Permalink to this post for sharing:

Manhattan Subway

And, when they think of NYC, they are usually thinking of Manhattan - one of the five boroughs that make up NYC.  The borough of Manhattan (New York County) is 24 square (land) miles of tall buildings that is the original New York City (the other four boroughs were added over time until 1898).

Those advocating for density often cite NYC (Manhattan really) as the model to be emulated.  Much of what they think about NYC isn't true, particularly commuting.  Lets look at the numbers.

Commute Flows

Summary:

Manhattan, with only 24 square miles of NYC's 305 sq. miles, is the job center for the NYC metro area.  With over 2.3 million jobs and only 734,000 resident workers, Manhattan has more than 4.5 jobs for every resident worker.  Nearly 80% (77.8%) of those who work in Manhattan commute in from other areas.

One would think that nearly all residents could find a job they like within an easy commute by walking, bus, or biking.    But, in fact, nearly 30% (29.7%) of those who live in Manhattan (one of the most expensive places in North America) commute out of it to work in places which are almost always cheaper to live in than Manhattan.

Looking at the changes over the 16 years from 2002 to 2018, we see an increase in commuters.  There is an increase in both the number and percentage of those who live in Manhattan commuting out.  Not only that, they are commuting from Manhattan further and further out.  It is a slow, steady increase.

Nonetheless, as of 2018, only 15% of Manhattan residents commute more than 10 miles from home, although that is slowly but steadily increasing.

Commute Flows:

From the US Census Tool "OnTheMap" we have the commute flows of Manhattan in the first image below.  This shows that 1.8M workers commuted into Manhattan, while 217,911 living in Manhattan commuted out, and 515,641 of those living in Manhattan worked there.

Figure 1 - Commute Flows 2018
(click to enlarge)

In Figure 2, below, we have the commute flows of Manhattan in 2002, 16 years earlier.  This shows that 1.4M workers commuted into Manhattan, while 146,013 living in Manhattan commuted out, and 436,580 of those living in Manhattan worked there.

Figure 2 - Commute Flows 2002
(click to enlarge)


Let us compare this with 2002 - 16 years earlier - and see what changed over time.

Below is the data from 2002.  Key points are that during those 16 years from 2002 to 2018, the number of jobs in Manhattan has increased by 512,404 (28.3%) while the number of those living in Manhattan increased by 150,959.  The number living in Manhattan and also working there increased only by 79,061 (18.1%).  Over the same period, the number of those living in Manhattan and commuting out increased by 71,898 (49.2%).  In other words nearly half of the increase in population of workers living in Manhattan during this period commuted out.  This resulted in an increase in the percentage of those living in Manhattan and commuting out from 25% to 30%.

Paradoxically, the addition of workers living in the job center resulted in a larger percentage commuting out of Manhattan - from 25% in 2002 to 30% in 2018.  We see this in figure 3 below:

Figure 3.  Commute flows - 2018 vs 2002
(click to enlarge)


Commute Distance and Direction:

In Figure 4 we see the changes from 2002 to 2018 in where and how far workers residing in Manhattan commute.  In that 16 year period, those commuting more than 10 miles to work increased by 40,000 - from 77,000 (12.1%of resident workers) to 107,000 (14.5% of residents), an increase of 39%.

Figure 4: Manhattan Residents
Commuting Distance & Direction
(click to enlarge)

In Figure 5, below, we see the changes from 2002 to 2018 in how far workers commuting into Manhattan travel.  In that 16 year period, those commuting more than 10 miles to work increased by 162,000 - from 698,000 (39%of non-resident workers) to 860,000 (37% of non-residents).  The percentage decreased but the sheer number increased.

Figure 5: Manhattan Non-Residents
Commuting INTO Manhattan - Distance & Direction
(click to enlarge)

The places that people commuting out of Manhattan is also available from "OnTheMap" by distance range.  The 10-24 mile commute range is shown below.

Figure 6: 10-24 Mile Commutes of Manhattan Residents
Shown in Purple
(click to enlarge)

Remarkably, workers are commuting from the most expensive major county in the US to much cheaper suburban areas, usually considered "bedroom communities".

Congestion and Time Lost to Commuting

The result of this density and concentration of jobs and housing has been some of the worst congestion in the world.

Those arguing that high density results in less commuting need to deal with the reality that the densest county in the US has seen a significant increase both in the number of commuters, and in their miles traveled to work.

The reality is that nearly 4 out of 5 of those who work in Manhattan commute from outside - often the suburbs or one of the more suburban parts of NYC such as Staten Island.  New York commutes take the longest time in the US.

Figure 7 - Commute Time
(click to enlarge)


Fortunately, NYC has an excellent (and expensive) public transit system.  Still congestion is worse than almost all other cities in the entire world.  The following chart from the Economist shows that in time lost to congestion, NYC is second only to LA, and tied with Moscow.  In terms of cost of congestion per driver, NYC is the absolute worst in the world.

Figure 8 - Commute Time Lost to Congestion

Conclusion:

Increased density does not result in better commuting.  It simply concentrates the congestion, and distributes the concomitant pollution to the suburbs.

Monday, April 26, 2021

Ridiculous RHNA ("Ree-na") - Part 3

Ridiculous RHNA ("Ree-na")

Part 3

All kinds of housing for all kinds of people

(Link to this post for sharing:

https://meetingthetwain.blogspot.com/2021/04/californias-2021-rhna-bills-part-1.html)

Summary:

We show that only 5% of CA cities and counties build as many houses as projected by their recent "Regional Housing Needs Allocation" goals. The other 95% didn't "make their RHNA numbers" and are therefore subject to "streamlining".  ("Regional Housing Needs Allocation" is abbreviated RHNA and pronounced "Ree-nah".)

Examples of jurisdictions large, medium and small show CA's Housing and Community Development agency's (HCD) RHNA numbers imply dramatically unrealistic growth in housing needs which therefore cannot be met by cities and counties.

Recent public comments in favor of raising RHNA numbers suggest that intent of high RHNA numbers is not to add more housing but to remove any restrictions towns and counties might put on building.

Other posts related to RHNA:


Background on RHNA

RHNA was established decades ago.  The idea was that California's increasing population needed more housing.   To assist cities and counties in planning for that housing the California Dept. of Finance estimates population growth which then become the basis for projected housing growth (RHNA numbers) for a region.  The RHNA numbers are administered by California's "Dept. of Housing and Community Development" (HCD).

An excellent history of the perversion of RHNA for political purposes is here:

https://www.berkeleyside.org/2021/10/25/berkeley-housing-rhna-development

Cities & counties don't actually build housing but simply authorize others to build it.  The only thing cities can do is zone land to accommodate projected growth.  Once the land is appropriately zoned to accommodate projected growth there is nothing else the city can do.  

Until recently, if no one built housing according to the RHNA numbers, HCD didn't do anything.  If the projected growth didn't happen, it was not presumed to be the fault of the city. That has changed with new legislation which implicitly assumes that cities can somehow induce buildings to be constructed by private development companies, or that it is only the cities that are holding back more housing from being built.

We show here:

  1. that RHNA numbers assume a rate of growth far higher than that of the last 30 years,
  2. that housing construction has kept up with population increase,
  3. that there are more housing units than households in every county in California,

We also propose ways to modify RHNA numbers to keep it line with realistic growth.

These facts are important because the proposed bills in the California legislature are based on the assumption that RHNA is a true assessment of future growth.  Therefore, the reasoning goes, if RHNA numbers are not met by a jurisdiction it must be the fault of the the jurisdiction.

Taking these items in sequence: 

                               RHNA Numbers are Unrealistic

California has 58 counties and 482 cities and towns (there is no legal distinction between a city and town) for a total of 540 jurisdictions.  Of those 540 cities and counties, HCD's 2019 "SB-35 Statewide Determination Summary" lists only 28 jurisdictions that comply with the RHNA numbers assigned them.  So, out of 540 jurisdictions only 5% (one in twenty) met their RHNA numbers.

Image 1: Intro segment of HCD 2019 SB-35

HCD's SB-35 Statewide Determination found at:

https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/docs/sb35_statewidedeterminationsummary.pdf

A look at the entire list of 28 jurisdictions shows that those meeting their RHNA numbers are small cities representing a tiny fraction of California's population.  RHNA numbers for counties do not refer to the entire population of the county but only the unincorporated parts of the county.  In populous counties like Santa Clara (nearly 2 million people) almost all of the population lives in incorporated cities which have their own RHNA numbers - the population under county control is very small.

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Some of the rationale given for assigning RHNA numbers is 'to ensure that all jurisdictions contribute to alleviating the housing shortage'.  The RHNA numbers for cities and counties are unrealistic and shows no relation to either historic growth patterns or any housing "shortage".  We show examples of small, medium and large jurisdictions for which RHNA is unrealistic.

Examples of extraordinarily unrealistic RHNA allocations

At the small end, consider Alpine County.  It borders Nevada just South of Lake Tahoe.  It had a total population of 1,200 in 2000, 1,175 in 2010 (decrease of 25) and an estimated 1,129 (decrease of 46) residents in 2019.  Over 96% of the land in the county is owned by the US as a National Park or National Forest.

Image 2:  Alpine County: Population 1,129 & Declining

5 housing units for every household
Failed to meet their RHNA goals and therefore subject to monthly fines up to $100,000.

According to the US Census, Alpine County (2019) comprised 350 households.  Home ownership is 84% as of 2019 compared to 64% for the US.  There are 1,782 housing units in Alpine County, i.e., about 5 housing units per household - meaning there are 1,432 are mostly empty vacation homes.  I.e., there are 4 empty housing units for every occupied one.

Image 3:  Alpine County: RHNA 
Alpine County RHNA mandated 11 "Above Moderate" housing units.
If only 10 were built Alpine could be subject to monthly fines up to $100,000 under AB 215.

With a population declining over 19 years, far away from the expensive coastal cities, almost everyone owning their home, and five housing units per household what is the possible justification for assigning any RHNA requirements at all to Alpine County?

Image 5:  HCD Determination
Not enough "Above Moderate Income" housing built in
298 Cities and counties so state laws for those that didn't meet their RHNA numbers kick in.

On Page 2 of 6

For Alpine County it is clear that RHNA devoid of any rational purpose.  Are there any other counties in a similar situation?  It turns out that there are a baker's dozen counties like Alpine County with small and declining populations (from 2010 to 2018), excess housing units, and high home ownership.  Throw in two more that have trivial increases and we have 15 rural counties without a housing problem yet potentially subject to high fines under Chiu's AB-215.

13 Counties Losing Population (plus 2 that didn't gain much)

  1. Sierra County              (33)  Population decreased by 33
  2. Alpine County             (21)  Population decreased by 21
  3. Calaveras County      (421)         "          "                  421, etc. 
  4. Del Norte County    (1,389)
  5. Kings County          (1,320)
  6. Lassen County        (3,984)
  7. Modoc County             (74)
  8. Mono County             (380)
  9. Mariposa County       (122)
  10. Plumas County          (234)
  11. Siskiyou County         (288)
  12. Trinity County            (151)
  13. Tuolumne County      (625)
  14. Amador County             +3    Population increased by   3
  15. Inyo County                 +31    Population increased by 31
AB 215 would allow the imposition of monthly fines of from $10,000 to $100,000 on these counties.  For Alpine County, $100,000/month works out to about $100 per month for every man, woman and child or about $3,600 per year for the typical household - probably more than their property tax - solely because no builder decided to put up housing in a sparsely populated county with a 5-to-1 housing surplus, and a declining population where 85% own their own home.

-------------- +++ -----------

For small jurisdictions, consider Amador City.

There are many small towns in California with declining populations as well.  Consider the town of Amador.  US Census 2019 population estimate of 190 down from 195 in 2000.

Image 4:  Amador City: Population 190 & Decreasing


Amador is among the 95% of California cities and counties that failed to meet their RHNA.  As in Alpine County builders didn't construct enough "Above Moderate Income" housing units so they get the full brunt of state law, just like Alpine County - see image 5 below from 2019 HCD.

Image 5:  HCD Determination
Not enough "Above Moderate Income" housing built in
298 Cities and counties so state laws for those that didn't meet their RHNA numbers kick in.

-------------- +++ -----------

For middle-sized jurisdictions, consider Pasadena.  

Image 6:  Pasadena, California
Home to the Rose Bowl

Since 1990 it has grown from 131,591 residents to 141,029,  i.e., an increase of 9,438 residents over 30 years or 315 residents per year.  It now faces a RHNA of 9,409 housing units over the next eight years.  This means HCD's numbers imply housing for an additional 23,522 residents (based on Pasadena's current household size of 2.5 people) or 2.5 times more residents in the next 8 years than they have increased in the last 30 years.  In 8 years that averages 2,940 more residents every year from RHNA vs. the actual 315 annual population increase over the last 30 years.  This is nearly 10 times more growth than the historical average!

-------------- +++ -----------

For large jurisdictions, consider Los Angeles, California's largest city.  Between 1990 and 2019 it grew from 3,485,398 residents to 3,979,576,  i.e., just over 500,000 residents in 30 years or about 16,700 new residents per year.  LA's RHNA allocation for the next 8 years is 82,000 housing units as seen in LA's City Housing Element Plan (page 79).

At LA's current 2.8 person household size this implies a growth of 229,600 residents in 8 years or 28,700 residents per year vs. the 16,700 residents per year over the last 30 years.  This is an addition of 12,000 more residents per year than the 30-year historical average.  In other words, RHNA projects growth 170% above the 30-year actual growth rate.

Image 7:  Los Angeles, California
Nearly four million residents
Los Angeles
Growth of 16,700 residents per year over the last 30 years.
RHNA implies 28,700 residents per year over the next 8 years.

Los Angeles in 2015 had 1,478,666 housing units for 1,383,869 households for a surplus of  95,000 housing units, i.e., nearly 7% more housing units than households.

Reason for Unrealistic RHNA numbers

The following SF Chronicle article from July-August 2020 makes it very clear that the point of higher RHNAs is to make sure cities and counties can't meet them.  



Quotes from article:

“If we got a RHNA number in line with the Southern California number, we would increase another 50%, which would mean more counties would not be hitting their number, which would mean that housing would be streamlined in those communities,”

"Matt Regan, who heads up policy at the Bay Area Council, a pro-business trade group, said he supports the highest possible number so that developers will be able to get quick approvals by doing 10% affordable."

When jurisdictions fail to meet their unrealistic RHNA goals, state mandated "streamlining" kicks in.  This means no public notices are required, and builders can put in only 10% "affordable housing" instead of city mandated numbers which are typically 15% or higher.  There are also reductions or eliminations of off-street parking requirements.

Conclusion to Part III

We have seen that failure to meet RHNA goals is not due to anything the cities and counties are, or are not doing but simply because RHNA is absurdly unrealistic in it's projections for growth.  RHNA needs to be radically altered, or simply abolished as it is extraordinarily unrealistic.